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Indicators, Dashboards,
Benchmarks, and
Scorecards in Regional
Economic Development:
Lessons Learned
S

tates and local economic
development organizations are
increasingly establishing indicators,
dashboards, and benchmarks intended
to both monitor economic and social
conditions in their region and, less often,
track the effectiveness of their programs
and initiatives. In this article I will
describe some pitfalls, large and small,
that can occur in the development of
these various performance yardsticks.
Pitfall #1: Stand-alone dashboards
The first pitfall is to allow these
statistical efforts to stand alone;
they should be a part of a larger
comprehensive regional development
strategy, which starts with the
development of a shared vision for the
region. This important step, which is
often ignored, provides the necessary
direction needed for the development of
a comprehensive economic development
strategy. Possible vision statements
can include the elimination of poverty,
achieving full employment, or the
development of a fully trained workforce.
While the vision may seem unobtainable,

it provides direction in defining the goals
in the comprehensive strategy.
Once the plan’s goals and
strategies have been hammered out,
its implementation should establish
performance metrics to measure its
progress. This is when it gets tricky; since
the ideal data series are rarely available,
organizations tend to track too many
available indicators, hoping that quantity
will make up for the lack of quality.
Once a vision and strategic goals
are in place, the creation of an effective
economic development dashboard,
benchmark analysis, or scorecard for a
region can play a crucial role in setting
strategies and measuring outcomes. The
definition of each is provided in Table
1. Two key steps are involved. First,
the region’s economic development
stakeholders must agree on the general
performance measures that should be
used to measure the expected outcomes.
Typically these include employment
growth, growth in per capita income,
output growth, or population change. It is
possible that the strategy is focused on a
certain aspect of economic development,
such as entrepreneurship, business
retention, or workforce development and
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Table 1 Measurement Tools and Analyses
Regional economic indicators—statistics that track a specific aspect of the regional economy.
By themselves, indicators are not very useful; however, they are the building blocks to more
useful tools. (See Erickcek et al. [2009].)
Dashboards—a well-designed, easy-to-read layout of key indicators or composite of indicators
that track the overall performance of the region and/or the organization’s efforts. It is important
to imagine the construction of a car’s dashboard and not that of the cockpit in a plane, with its
myriad of gauges and readouts. It should have a small number of community-wide indicators as
well as program indicators. (See Eberts, Erickcek, and Kleinhenz [2006] and Erickcek [2007].)
Regional benchmarks—a comparative analysis that contrasts the performance of the region with
that of strong-performing communities, that share similar economic, social, and/or demographic
characteristics. The key challenge in this activity is to select the right comparison areas. (For rural
Michigan comparisons, see Erickcek and Watts [2003].)
Scorecards—a statistical report that tracks the performance of the region on identified key
indicators over time and/or across communities.

training. In these instances, the measures
are less broad based. For community
organizations, the performance measure
could be the reduction of the area’s
poverty rate.
The next step, identifying factors
that drive these performance measures,
is much more difficult and has three
separate approaches. The first relies on
experts’ judgment. An advisory board of
economic development experts can be
called together to identify key growth
factors. However, this can generate
concern that it is yet another “top-down”
approach that will not ref ect the needs or
interest of the regional residents.
The second way is to obtain
community input by organizing town
hall meetings where residents and
businesses can express their views on
the important growth factors. While this
approach can build community support
and “buy-in” to the resulting strategies,
it is highly subjective and can ignore
empirically based research findings on
what factors are important The issues
that arise from these meetings can be
very local—streetscape issues or the
redevelopment of an abandoned mill site,
for example—or very general, such as
poverty reduction.
The third approach to developing an
economic development dashboard is
statistically based—identifying factors
that are statistically associated with the
movement of the performance measures.
In several studies we have used both
factor and regression analyses. First, we
separate the factor analysis groups from
40 to 70 indicators into “factors” based
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on how strongly correlated they are
with each other. We typically find that
six to eight factors are generated by the
analysis, which can “explain” up to 90
percent of the variation of the indicators.
Based on which indicators fall into which
factor, the factors can be interpreted and
labeled. For example, we have found
that indicators that monitor the skills of
a region’s workforce tend to be strongly
associated with each other and are
typically grouped into one factor that can
be labeled a skilled workforce.
We then run these calculated factors
in a regression model to statistically
determine if they are associated with
the selected performance indicators. In
our previous work, we have consistently
found that
• a skilled workforce is strongly
associated with per capita income
growth;
• business dynamics—the opening and
closing of firms and the number of
small establishments—is strongly
associated with employment growth;
• the region’s industrial legacy—
its history of manufacturing—is
negatively related to employment
growth; and
• social isolation by income or
race is negatively associated with
employment growth.
Pitfall #2: Believing that more is better
One of the benefits of the statistically
based approach is that it identifies a

limited number of growth factors, which
avoids the pitfall of not appreciating the
fact that less is more. Tracking more
data does not necessarily generate more
clarity if the data are highly duplicative
or measure activities that are not related
to the goals of the organization. Some
studies contain more than 100 indicators
and can leave even the most attentive
reader in a fog. Often two indicators
seemingly tracking the same factor can
move in the opposite direction. For
example, employment by place of work
often goes in a different direction from
employment by place of residency in
the short run. Too many indicators can
only add confusion, lead to inaction,
and, in general, do more harm than good.
Remember, the resulting dashboard
should look more like that found in a car
than in the cockpit of an airplane.
Finally, once the performance
measures are set and the factors that
are associated with them are identified,
then the regional economic development
organization is set to develop strategies
or tactics to address these factors. The
key point is that the organization does not
develop strategies that directly impact the
performance measure, such as create jobs
or personal income. Instead, the regional
economic development effort is directed
at forming more realistic strategies that
address the factors associated with the
performance indicators, such as creating
a small business assistance program,
designing customized training programs
for area employers, or conducting
retention visits with area employers. It
is particularly challenging for economic
development organizations to implement
a strategy because they cannot direct
area firms to follow the plan that may
call for the adoption of better technology,
the provision of workplace training, and
the development of new products for
expanding markets. Instead, they can only
attempt to create an environment that is
conducive for these actions, through the
use of incentives and technical assistance.
At best, economic and community
development organizations have only a
marginal influence on a limited number
of the inputs required to substantially
change the economic performance of
their communities.
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The lack of direct control over the
region’s economic assets, resources,
and business decision making can be
one of the most challenging aspects of
implementing a strategic plan. Therefore,
when constructing regional performance
measures, it is necessary to control
expectations. An excellent economic
strategy can be thwarted by a bad
economy or by a corporate decision to
relocate a major regional operation.
Pitfall #3: Performance measures as
net impact evaluations
In fact, this leads to another major
pitfall to avoid: using performance
measures to evaluate the impact of
economic initiatives or programs. Change
in regional per capita income is one of
the best measures of an area’s economic
performance. However, even the most
effective economic development program
will likely have little or no impact on
the area’s per capita income. National,
demographic, and industrial factors that
are completely outside the influence of
local organizations can have a much
greater impact on an area’s per capital
income. One of the greatest fears I
have is that an outstanding economic
development program that is costeffective and generates positive results
could be terminated because it did not
do the impossible: make a noticeable
bump in the area’s per capita income
or employment statistics. This is why a
dashboard or scorecard should include
program specific indicators as well as
broader growth factors.
To recap, the development of
regional performance measures should
be part of a comprehensive economic
development strategy that identifies
the key growth factors that impact the
region’s performance measurements.
In some respect, the performance
measurements—employment growth
and per capita income, for example—
could be considered a mountain peak,
and the dashboard or scorecard tracks
the progress of a community up the
mountain. The summit may never be
reached, but the community’s progress is
being recorded.
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Pitfall #4: Fixating on one indicator
There are two additional pitfalls that
must be avoided along the climb. The
first of these is to aim solely at a specific
indicator. Indicators are simply that: they
indicate if the region is going in the right
direction. They provide evidence that the
region’s workforce is becoming more
skilled or the business environment is
more dynamic. The regional economic
development strategy should be directed
at improving the quality of an area’s
workforce or in enhancing the area’s
business environment and not aimed at
moving a certain indicator. The selected
indicators should not become the focus
of the strategy. Instead, they simply
monitor whether a growth environment is
being developed in the region. Although
the percentage of residents between the
ages of 25 and 34 who have a bachelor’s
degree or higher is a reasonable indicator
of the quality of the region’s workforce,
raising this percentage would prove to
be a difficult economic development
strategy to articulate. Instead, the strategy
could be to increase the number of
internships offered to college graduates in
the area, promote the area to professional
and engineering services, and encourage
social and cultural events aimed at young
professionals.
Pitfall #5: Mistaking output or inputs
for outcomes
The final pitfall is mistaking outputs—
or even worse, inputs—for outcomes.
The amount of resources utilized in
generating activities should not be used
as a measurement of the results of these
activities. For example, a local economic
development effort should not be
measured by the number or size of fully
serviced, site-ready parcels of industrial
space that have been developed (inputs)
or the number of brochures or tours
generated (outputs). What matters is the
amount of investment made in the area
due to the availability of the site-ready
parcels.
In conclusion, regional economic
development strategies depend upon
partnerships, the leadership and
innovation of their key industries, the

attitudes of its citizenry, and, of course,
simple luck. Clearly, if a region’s
residents do not believe in the importance
of education, and if its major companies
are not generating new products, its
economic development organization
cannot simply fire its residents and firms
and hire new ones. Thus I believe that
economic development organizations
should be cautious in the development
of economic indicators and dashboards,
and be aware that regional performance
measures are difficult to move and are
impacted by events clearly outside the
control of the organization. As with your
car, an economic dashboard can show
your speed (growth), fuel levels (human
and physical resources), and miles
traveled (industrial legacy); however,
it says very little about the quality of
your engine. An economic development
organization should, of course, watch all
these indicators, but its strategies should
focus on improving the quality of its
economic engine.
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Michael F. Addonizio and C. Philip Kearney

Beating the Odds
The authors have a forthcoming book
titled Education Reform and the Limits
of Policy: Lessons from Michigan, which
the Upjohn Institute is publishing. This
article uses that book as a basis to discuss
a recent announcement from the Obama
administration. Interested readers may preorder the book at http://www.upjohninstitute.
org/publications/forthcoming.html.

I

n early September 2011, the Obama
administration announced that it intends
to waive cornerstone requirements of
the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),
particularly the requirement that all
students be prof cient in reading and
math by 2014. In the words of President
Obama, this waiver will “give states
the freedom to set their own studentachievement goals and design their
own interventions for failing schools.”
The NCLB waiver plan, in effect,
replaces the law’s current deadline for
mandatory proficiency by 2014 with an
approach that gives states considerable
flexibility in setting their own goals
and determining the shape and timing
of their interventions. In exchange, the
states must commit to three actions:
1) adopt standards for career and college
readiness, 2) focus improvement efforts
on the most troubled schools, and 3)
create guidelines for teacher evaluation
based in part on student performance
(McNeil and Klein 2011). To set the
waiver plan in motion, Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan has released
guidelines providing additional
information regarding the plan, including
the specific criteria that the states and
their local school districts would have to
meet in order to receive the waivers (U.S.
Department of Education 2011).
In this article, rather than outline
and comment upon the entire NCLB
waiver plan, we direct our attention
to the second of the three actions
identified above: focus improvement
efforts on the most troubled schools. We
see this aspect of the waiver plan as a
promising opportunity to pursue a readymade experiment centered on the two
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complementary questions of educational
adequacy and efficiency. Under the
second action, states will be required
to develop and implement a system of
differentiated recognition, which calls for
the state to establish three new categories
of schools: 1) priority schools—those
in the bottom 5 percent in terms of
academic prof ciency; 2) focus schools—
those with the largest achievement gaps
between subgroups, such as between
racial-ethnic groups; and 3) reward
schools. The reward schools, in turn, are
of three types: 1) the highest performing
schools in the state, the top 5 percent;
2) the highest progress schools in the
state, the 5 percent with the highest rates
of improvement; and 3) the schools in

To truly improve academic
performance in Michigan’s
most troubled schools, the state
will need to produce a flood of
“beat the odds” schools.
the state that beat the odds—that is,
they performed better than predicted
on student achievement and on closing
achievement gaps.
We focus our article on this last group
of schools and the lessons we as a state
can learn from them. These are schools
that, based on their socioeconomic and
racial-ethnic characteristics, as well
as their past records of low academic
performance, demonstrate substantial
annual improvement in student academic
prof ciency far beyond what might
normally be expected. In effect, these
schools, despite their challenging
circumstances, literally beat the odds. The

balance of this article outlines a strategy
to identify the key characteristics of these
exemplary schools and determine the
resource levels needed to replicate their
success in schools throughout Michigan.
The identification of these schools,
which is required under the waiver
provisions, and the rich data lode on
each of these schools available from
the Michigan Department of Education
(MDE) and the Center for Educational
Performance and Information (CEPI),
present a superb opportunity to explore
in depth the twin and oft-beguiling
questions of educational adequacy and
educational efficiency. If Michigan
were to apply for a waiver, researchers
could plumb the MDE and CEPI data
banks to identify, explore, and catalog
the specific interventions—curricular
and otherwise—that produce these
improvements in the “beat the odds”
schools, hence, addressing the adequacy
question. In particular, the MDE’s
Office of School Improvement would
help researchers identify and record
the essential components in a “beat
the odds” school’s program design, as
well as the steps the school followed in
implementing its design. The Office of
School Improvement also would become
the primary conduit for disseminating
proven practices for beating the odds
to other low-achieving schools. Such a
strategy could boost achievement levels
across schools in Michigan, where
academic outcomes lag behind those in
the majority of states. As shown in Table
1, Michigan’s 4th and 8th graders fall
short of their nationwide counterparts
in reading and math achievement,
respectively, on the National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP), and
fall far short of the levels achieved in
Massachusetts, the highest scoring state.
Tapping into the same data lode,
researchers also would be able to identify

Table 1 Academic Achievement in Reading and Mathematics, Percent Proficient,
NAEP 2009, Grade 4 Elementary and Grade 8 Middle School
NAEP grade 4 reading
NAEP grade 8 math
Michigan
30
31
United States
33
34
Massachusetts
47
52
SOURCE: Education Week (2009).

Employment Research
and catalog the actual costs of the
interventions that led to the improved
performance, hence, addressing the
efficiency question. The MDE’s Office of
Financial Management and its Michigan
Educational Information System would
provide the f nancial information—
revenues and expenditures—necessary
to “cost out” the specific programmatic
interventions implemented in a given
“beat the odds” school. The ultimate
question, of course, is how much will
a successful intervention cost? To truly
improve academic performance in
Michigan’s most troubled schools, the
state will need to produce a flood of
“beat the odds” schools. Such costingout studies are gaining credibility in
education policy circles and in the courts,
where state school f nance systems have
been challenged (Koski 2011). This
approach uses student achievement and
expenditure data to estimate the costs
of achieving targeted proficiency levels
on state assessments in all schools and
districts, adjusting for the additional costs
faced by individual schools who educate
children who live in poverty or have
language or special education needs.1
This approach to school funding and
policymaking, while enjoying growing
support across the states, is not without
its critics. One line of criticism asserts
that costing out fails to identify specific
policies, programs, and practices that lead
to academic success. Answers to these
important questions, however, may be
found through careful case studies of the
“beat the odds” schools that are initially
identified through analysis of state
administrative data. Both quantitative and
qualitative methods would be needed to
identify and analyze these exceptional
schools and help export the details of their
successes to other schools across the state.
A second criticism, articulated
most forcefully by Stanford University
economist Eric Hanushek (2007), is that
these studies do not capture the true costs
of attaining the target outcomes. Rather,
they merely cite the spending levels of
schools that may or may not be efficient.
This argument rests on the concept
of economic cost, a term often used
interchangeably with efficiency to refer
to the minimum expenditure required
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to achieve a particular outcome. In the
context of education and school finance,
the task Hanushek poses is to establish
the desired level of achievement and then
determine the least amount of money
needed to produce it.
In our view, no educational cost study
can attain this theoretical ideal. While
a least-cost method of production may
be ascertained for the manufacture of
a toaster or an automobile of specified
quality, educational achievement is far
too complex a phenomenon to reliably
identify an economically efficient means
of production. We find the argument of
Michael Rebell of Columbia University
more persuasive on the issue of cost
studies in education. Rebell (2006)
observes that “ . . . no type of economic
analysis can establish a definitive causal
connection between a precise funding

need, cost, and efficiency. Well-designed
studies exploiting Michigan’s substantial
programmatic, financial, and student data
sets can reveal the valuable lessons of
our “beat the odds” schools and vastly
improve the quality of our school funding
decisions. We have the capability to
conduct these studies. What we need
now is the political will to do so—to take
action to capitalize on the opportunity
currently offered under the NCLB waiver
plan.
Note
1. Four alternative methods have been
developed by researchers to estimate the cost
of an adequate education. A description of
each method is beyond the scope of this brief
essay. For a discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of each, see Rebell (2006).
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2012 Early Career Research Grant Program
The Upjohn Institute requests proposals for Early Career Research Grants (previously called Mini-Grants). These grants are
intended to provide resources to junior faculty (untenured and within six years of earning the PhD) to carry out policy-related
research on labor market issues. The Institute supports and encourages research on all issues related to labor markets and is
especially interested in topics related to the recent recession and current recovery.
Early Career Research Grant recipients are expected to write a research paper based on the funded work for submission to
the Institute’s working paper series; submit the paper to a peer-reviewed journal; and prepare a synopsis of the research for
possible publication in the Institute’s newsletter, Employment Research.
The maximum funding for an Early Career Research Grant is $5,000.
Application Procedure
Applicants should submit a proposal of at most 1,200 words (approximately four double-spaced pages) describing the proposed
research and its relevance to labor market policy. The proposal should include an abstract and a brief budget. Applications
must also include a current Curriculum Vita.
Submissions by e-mail are accepted at communications@upjohn.org.
Evaluation Criteria
Proposals for Early Career Research Grants will be evaluated according to the following criteria:
1) Contribution to important labor market policy issues and to the professional literature
2) Technical merit
3) Professional qualifications
Specific Instructions
The Institute does not pay indirect costs but will entertain any legitimate research expense as part of the budget. Acceptable
items include costs for professional, technical, and support personnel; data acquisition; materials and supplies; computer
services; and travel. The Institute does not fund dissertation research (although it does have a Dissertation Award program).
We expect the research to be completed within a year.
Early Career Research Grant payments will be made to the individual upon award.
Applications for all grants shall become the property of the Upjohn Institute. It is Institute policy to require submission of the
research paper to its working paper series. Unaccepted proposals and rejected research papers will be returned upon request,
without restrictions on further use by others. It is also Institute policy to encourage publication of the sponsored research in
scholarly journals following submission of the research paper to the Institute. Submission of any material waives all rights to
make any claim because of any use thereof by the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, its agents and employees.
Submission Deadline and Notification Date
February 1, 2012—Deadline to apply
February 29, 2012—Announcement of awards
Applications are to be addressed to:
Institute Grant Committee
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686.
Inquiries and submissions may be sent to communications@upjohn.org.
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New Books
The Transformation
of the American
Pension System

Advances in
Economic
Forecasting

Imagining the Ideal
Pension System

Was It Beneficial for Workers?

Matthew L. Higgins, Editor

Dana M. Muir and
John A. Turner, Editors

Edward N. Wolff
Beginning in the 1980s, many
employers switched the type of pension
plans they offer their workers from
defined benefit (DB) plans to def ned
contribution (DC)
plans.
Edward N.
Wolff refers to
this as the “Great
Transformation,”
and for good
reason. From
1983 to 2007, the
share of families
with DC plans
rose from 12 percent to 64 percent,
while the share with DB plans fell from
69 percent to 39 percent. This change,
as Wolff shows, generated growing
income inequality and insecurity
among retirees while escalating the
importance of Social Security as a
source of retirement income
Through exhaustive analysis, Wolff
identifies the weaknesses in the current
private pension system and offers
practical, policy-based solutions aimed
at strengthening the system, thereby
making retirement a less daunting
prospect for workers relying on 401(k)
plans as a key source of retirement
income and wealth.
“At last, in one place, here is all the
data one would want on the impact on
households of the dramatic shift from
def ned benef t plans to 401(k)s. If you
want the numbers, read this book.”
—Alicia H. Munnell, Director, Center
for Retirement Research at Boston
College
333 pp. 2011
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-380-7
$20 paper 978-0-88099-379-1

Generally speaking (there were a few
notable exceptions), the economics
profession, including those who
specialize
in economic
forecasting,
missed
predicting one
of the greatest
economic
downturns in
recent times,
the “Great
Recession.”
With the wealth of data sources and
sophisticated statistical modeling
techniques at their disposal, how could
these specialists have whiffed? That’s
a question many in the profession
have been asking themselves as they
reexamine the toolset used for making
economic projections
Higgins presents six chapters
that focus on how the reliability of
economic forecasts can be improved.
Three of the chapters focus on
forecasting in real time while
predicting turning points for macro
aggregate measures such as gross
domestic product, inflation, growth,
and unemployment. Authors of two
chapters argue that data can be more
efficiently exploited through model
and forecast combination. They, along
with the authors of another chapter,
also advocate for using models that
are adaptive and perform well in the
presence of nonlinearity and structural
change.
185 pp. 2011
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-384-5
$15 paper 978-0-88099-383-8

International Perspectives

The burgeoning of populations
at or near retirement is causing a
reconsideration of existing pension
system policies in many countries
aaround the
world. Systems
w
tthat once ably
sserved to protect
tthe economic
ssecurity of the
eelderly are now
aat risk, due
iin large part
tto the global
eeconomic crisis,
but also to changing demographics.
Broad differences among countries in
cultures and attitudes toward the roles
of government and of capital markets
in affecting citizens’ retirement income
making a “one-size-fits-all” approach
infeasible.
Recognizing that pension systems
need to be examined on a country-bycountry basis, pension experts from 10
countries gathered in September 2010
to propose what they view as the ideal
pension systems for their countries. The
papers they presented are gathered in
this new volume. The authors reveal
how and why the image of an ideal
pension system differs across countries
and recognize the various long-term
goals that different actors have for
pension systems.
They also address the age at which
retirement benef ts should be made
available, levels of coverage that
should be provided, risk sharing,
benef t adequacy, and issues related to
increased longevity.
293 pp. 2011
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-382-1
$20 paper 978-0-88099-381-4

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686

Nonprofit Org.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
Kalamazoo MI
Permit No. 756

ORDER FORM
Book/Author

Qty Cloth

The Transformation of the American Pension System
Wolff

To order a publication or request a catalog, mail
phone, fax or e-mail:
Qty Paper

Total Price

___ @ $40

___ @ $20

__________

Advances in Economic Forecasting
Higgins, ed.

___ @ $40

___ @ $15

__________

Imagining the Ideal Pension System
Muir and Turner, eds.

___ @ $40

___ @ $20

__________

Subtotal $ __________

Shipping/Handling
U.S.A. and Canada: $5.00 f rst book, $1.00 each additional book.
Elsewhere: $6.00 f rst book, $1.50 each additional book.

Plus Shipping $ __________
TOTAL $ ___________

SHIP TO:
Name
Address

State

PAYMENT: All orders must include check, credit
card information, or purchase order. Checks must
be payable to the W.E. Upjohn Institute in U.S.
funds drawn on a U.S. bank. All prices are subject
to change without notice.
___ check enclosed
___ VISA
___ Mastercard
___ P. O. # ________________________

Organization
City

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
Toll-free (888) 227-8569
Phone (269) 343-4330
Fax (269) 343-7310
E-mail: publications@upjohn.org

Zip
signature

BILL TO: (Must attach purchase order)

credit card #
Name
Address

Organization
City

State

expiration date
Zip

phone

January 2012

